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The Emergence of Russian Private Military Companies: A New Tool of 
Clandestine Warfare 
In recent years, the Russian private security and military company (PMSC) industry has 
evolved to serve the needs of both business clients as well as governments. Thus far, the 
ties between the Kremlin and the Russian PMSC industry are ambiguous and seem to vary 
across the different companies. What seems clear though, is that the Kremlin is 
experimenting with the utility of these companies and that the use of PMSCs is on the rise. 
Private security and military companies are neither explicitly legal nor illegal in Russia, a 
status that may serve Russian authorities well in situations where attribution and attention 
is unwanted. While the exact shape and role of the Russian PMSC industry may not be 
carved out fully, Russia is now home to a small, but potent, PMSC industry that can be 
mobilised to inflict harm on the country’s enemies.  
Keywords: Private military companies, Russia, hybrid warfare, military capability 
Introduction 
In recent years, private military and security companies (PMSCs) appeared in many parts of the 
world. The example set by the US in particular, including its extensive use of PMSCs in military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been a source of inspiration for many other countries, 
including Russia. While some of the Russian PMSCs have received considerable media attention 
during the past couple of years, there is still little systematic study of the Russian PMSC industry 
and its capabilities.1 Speculations also abound in terms of if and how these companies relate to 
Russian authorities and Russian foreign policy. This article directs attention to these questions and 
discusses some of the implications that Russian use of PMSCs may have for the security of 
Western countries. By way of introduction, the article first provides a brief description of the 
Russian PMSC industry.  
The early Russian PMSC industry 
1 There is however an increasing number of studies on the subject of Russian PMSCs. These include among others 
Marten, K. (2019); Spearin, C. (2018); Sukhankin, S. (2019); Østensen, Å. G. & Bukkvoll, T. (2018).  
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In the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, surplus Russian military and state security personnel 
frequently established domestic security companies but some also got acquainted with the 
international PMSC industry. Former Russian soldiers served as body guards and carried out 
diverse types of protective work while Russian pilots and technicians were attractive to companies 
operating aircraft (Lock, 1999). The South African mercenary PMSC, Executive Outcomes for 
instance employed Russian Mi-17 and Mi-24 attack helicopters and Russian and Ukrainian pilots 
and technicians to operate them (Reno, 1997). A lot of surplus military transport planes and 
helicopters ended up on private hands in this period, some of which is still on the market.  
The downsizing of the Soviet military not only demobilized individual troops, but also 
entire cadres and military units. According to one observer, some of the demobilized elite military 
formations maintained sufficient cohesion to reconstitute themselves as, in effect, readymade 
PMSCs (Axelrod, 2013). The company ‘Alpha Group’ was created out of Group A (Alpha Group), 
one of two FSB special forces units. Alpha Group was later acquired by ArmorGroup sometime 
between 1999 and 2003.2 Another early Russian PMSC that disappeared or mutated is RusCorp 
Group. In 2010 RusCorp described itself as an ‘international security holding company’ 
headquartered in Moscow and with offices in Nigeria, Iraq, the United States, the UK and ‘other 
selected European countries’. The company claimed to have wide experience from emergency and 
high-risk environments and to deliver services within ‘all aspects of security’ (PrivateMilitary.org, 
2010). As such, RusCorp appears to have been an armed private protection company, with what 
perhaps can be described as a rather ‘gun toting’ image, not uncommon in the early 2000s.  
Parts of the early Russian PMSC industry also hail back to the organization of volunteers 
in foreign wars and thus have little to do with protective services. As an example, the St Petersburg 
based security company named Rubikon, supervised by Russian security services, was central in 
organizing volunteers to fight on the side of the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s 
(InformNapalm, 2015). 
After 9/11, the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan presented huge business opportunities 
for PMSCs. Russian companies also rushed to the scene in order to cater to Russian corporations 
in particular. The so called ‘non-government educational centre’ Antiterror was established in 
2003 with the assistance of the Russian Union of Paratroopers. Antiterror signed contracts for the 
2 ArmorGroup also had acquired well-known Defence Systems Limited (DSL) in 1997 and was itself acquired by 
G4S Risk Management and morphed into that company in 2008 (Østensen, 2011). 
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protection of the oil and gas infrastructure of the companies Tatneft, Energoinzheniering and the 
Russian Engineering Company in the mid-2000s (Konovalov and Valetskii, 2013). In 2010, the 
Russian oil company Lukoil established its own security company – Lukom-A – to protect 
investments in Iraq. According to Arkadii Babchenko, the Lukoil subsidiary was by law just a 
regular private security company, but in reality, it was a PMSC. The same author also claims that 
the next trigger for the PMSC business in Russia was Somali piracy (Popkov, 2016). Much like 
Western shippers, Russian ship-owners needed protection for their vessels in the Gulf of Aden. 
Russian security companies however quickly got the reputation for a ‘shoot first’ approach 
designed to deter pirates from attacking Russian flagged ships in the first place. Thus, in terms of 
timing, the development of Russian PMSCs seems to largely follow international trends.  
The Contemporary Russian PMSC industry 
According to the Russian experts Ivan Konovalov and Oleg Valetskii, earlier this decade 
there were between 10 and 20 PMSCs in Russia (2013). Accurate and up-to-date numbers are non-
existent, largely due to the secretive nature of the industry, but also because of the difficulties 
involved in determining exactly which organisations qualify as a PMSC, and because they are not 
yet officially legal. The better-known companies are Moran Security, RSB-Group, Wagner, Mar, 
ENOT Corp., Patriot and Shchit.3 Moran Security, the RSB-Group and Shchit in many ways 
resemble Western PMSCs; Wagner and Patriot are more government-hired mercenaries than 
PMSCs; while Mar and ENOT are smaller, ideologised companies active mostly in the post-Soviet 
space. ENOT was disbanded in late 2018, and the leader arrested on charges of extortion 
(Polykhina 2019). The ideological anchoring of some Russian PMSCs sets them apart from 
Western PMSCs, which except from declaring that they support their home countries’ troops, 
usually insist on being apolitical actors. Another difference between Western PMSCs and their 
Russian cousins is that Western PMSCs are heavily involved with military support services and 
logistics, types of services that Russian PMSCs do not appear to focus on, or even offer, as of yet. 
3 There have also been reports of a company called Vega Strategic Services allegedly providing military training to 
the pro-Syrian government militia Liwa al-Quds (aka the Jerusalem Brigade); however, some sources have claimed 
the company’s existence may be part of a counter-propaganda campaign carried out by media outlets close to the 
Kremlin. See Sukhankin (2019). 
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Wagner is undoubtedly both the largest and the most well known of the Russian PMSCs 
because of its role in Russia’s war effort in Syria. However, several of these companies may yet 
become active both in a potential escalated conflict with the West and in conflict theatres in the 
developing world. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in terms of military hardware, none of 
these companies are likely to be able to fight on the level of regular military units unless they are 
armed as such by the Russian military itself.  
Even though this article denotes these companies ‘private security and military companies’, 
several of the Russian companies hardly fit a categorization as commercial actors.4  In fact, it may 
even be a stretch to call Wagner a private company. Some of the Russian PMSCs are business 
ventures, selling their services to other commercial actors in a commercial and competitive market 
e.g. for piracy protection. Wagner however appears more of a mercenary outfit, understood to 
mean an outfit that also offer combat services as opposed to mere protective services.5 
Furthermore, their services seem to be exclusive to parts of the Russian security apparatus or to a 
handful of clients approved by that same apparatus. However, Russian PMSCs are not 
homogeneous. Some seem to be designed primarily to be proxy forces that can take commercial 
assignments for approved clients on the side. Others appear primarily to be commercial actors that 
act as proxies when they are called to do so. Compared to Western companies, most Russian 
companies seem however to be less weary of providing services close to the combat spectrum. In 
contrast, the large segment of the Western industry that competes for contracts for (Western) state 
clients and which operates on the open market will shy away from services that will associate them 
with combat as that will warrant the much dreaded mercenary association, which in the West has 
a clear delegitimizing effect. After several Blackwater ‘scandals’ in particular, Western companies 
have also become very sensitive to bad publicity and many also find that operating in complex war 
zones is simply too risky. In addition, most Western companies also lack the cohesion and 
coordinated training necessary to operate in substitution of an army unit.  
 Like any other national ‘market for force’, Russian PMSCs are shaped not only by supply 
and demand, but also by the cultural, historical, political and legal environment they exist within. 
                                                          
4 The issues of how to define these types of companies has been a constant matter of academic discussion since the early 2000s. 
Making categorical distinctions between different companies that broadly speaking can be labelled PMSCs, has largely proven 
difficult under most circumstances because companies themselves are flexible and because most categories tend to merge into 
one another. Consequently, analyzing what companies of this sort do may be more fruitful than what they are.  
5 This is not to suggest that there always is a clear demarcation line between combat and protective work when push comes to 
shove, but it also does not suggest that protective work cannot be separated from offensive soldiering. 
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The industry is affected by the national institutional environment, informal and formal regulations, 
national military culture, popular acceptance, historical propensity for using private actors to 
exercise force, relations to government structures and elites, and many other factors. In short, 
companies will be ‘socialized’ by their home environment, even when acting internationally 
(Flohr, Rieth, Schwindenhammer & Wolf, 2010). In the case of Russian PMSCs this so far has 
resulted in a crossbreed PMSC industry populated by some Western style companies, some 
mercenary outfits and some ideologically driven units which resemble armed militias. Common to 
them all is that they exist at the mercy of the authorities and thus that they may need to prove their 
worth in order to continue to exist.  
 
PMSCs and the state  
The Russian state at present seems relatively ambivalent about the phenomenon of PMSCs. In fact, 
when a new proposal for the legalization of PMSC again was raised in Russian media at the 
beginning of 2018, Putin’s spokesman Dmitrii Peskov simply stated that the Kremlin ‘has no 
position on this question’ (Aptekar, 2018). Despite their undeniable existence, PMSCs are not yet 
explicitly regulated by Russian law. 
These companies are furthermore also largely absent from Russian military theory, at least 
in terms of PMSCs being an instrument in the Russian military toolbox (Eklund and Elfving, 
2018). In the latest 2014 version of the official Russian military doctrine, PMSCs are only 
mentioned in the context of foreign threats (Neelov, 2017). Likewise, in a major new Russian work 
on future war written by the military intellectuals Igor Popov and Musa Khamsatov, PMSCs are 
mostly described as a Western phenomenon. They are (as of yet) not prescribed any particular role 
in future Russian security politics (Popov and Khamzatov, 2017, 256–259). 
Russian motives for developing a PMSC industry 
The Russian debate on PMSCs suggests at least four main drivers for their development: profits, 
military emulation, the companies’ potential as a non-attributional means of coercion and avoiding 
an Afghanistan-type loss aversion situation among the public.  
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In terms of profits, it is worth recalling that Russia is home to a large and lucrative domestic 
private security sector, which in 2011 was worth US $7 billion annually (Galeotti, 2013). Russia 
and Russian decision makers are hence accustomed to not only the concept of privately supplied 
security, but also to the revenues that such a sector generates. The Deputy Head of the Duma 
(Russian parliament) Sub-Committee for Statebuilding and Legislation, Mikhail Emelianov, 
maintains that the private military industry is an internationally rapidly growing market dominated 
thus far by Western countries (the US and the UK in particular), and he argues that there is huge 
untapped potential for Russia. As Emelianov put it, ‘Our history is such that we always had to 
fight wars. Why not exploit this experience [for profit]?’(Kovalenko and Baltacheva, 2018). The 
dominance of Western companies within the private protection market in war zones troubles 
Russian decision makers. The fact that the country’s PMSC industry is underdeveloped has led 
Russian companies to seek protective services from Western companies in war zones, which has 
caused Russian interests to miss out on business opportunities. Russian military observer Ivan 
Konovalov suggests that many developing nations’ governments may welcome the emergence of 
PMSCs with geopolitical affiliations that differ from those of the West (Eremenko, 2014). This 
argument is supported by the recent experience of Russian PMSCs in several African countries, 
and possibly also in backing President Maduro in Venezuela.  
A second motive could simply be to adopt what appears to be a useful foreign political 
instrument for the US and the UK in particular. Military emulation is a well-known international 
phenomenon. It would be fair to say that the radical reform of the Russian armed forces initiated 
by Minister of Defence Anatolii Serdiukov in 2008 was, to a significant extent, an emulation of 
reforms that occurred in many Western countries after the end of the Cold War. Thus, it is not 
unnatural to see the development of Russian PMSCs essentially as a conscious attempt to imitate 
what may appear to be a smart innovation by the West. For example, an article in the Russian 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) daily Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star) from 2013 argued that PMSCs is a 
‘phenomenon of our times’ that the West has understood but in which Russia has lagged behind 
(Palchikov, 2013). There is, however, reason to doubt that the Russian political-economic model 
is producing a PMSC market similar to those that exist in many Western countries, given that there 
is currently a very strong tendency towards monopolies in many sectors of the Russian economy. 
In 2014, Oleg Krinitsin, the head of RSB-Group, expressed concern regarding the potential for a 
genuine neoliberal Russian PMSC market. His suspicion was that Russia was more likely to end 
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up with some ‘clumsy monopoly structure’ (Boiarskii, 2014). Such a model may serve the 
Kremlin’s interests well.  
Third, the possibility of using a certain level of force in pursuing your national interests 
without this force being attributed to you is clearly tempting. Russian voices in the PMSC debate 
are certain that Western countries already do this (Neelov, 2017), and President Putin himself has 
talked about PMSCs as ‘an instrument for the realisation of national interests where the state itself 
does not have to be involved’ (RIA-Novosti, 2012). Furthermore, investigative Russian reporters 
suggest that some members of the Russian General Staff were sold on the idea during a 
presentation delivered to them by the founder of the South African company Executive Outcomes, 
Eben Barlow, on the side-lines of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in 2010. It was the non-
attribution aspect in particular that apparently triggered the generals’ interest (Malkova and Baev, 
2019).  
PMSCs also provides the opportunity to offer covert international assistance to allied 
regimes.  Duma representative Gennadii Nosovko, who proposed one of the laws relating to the 
legalisation of PMSCs, has even publicly indicated that Russian PMSCs could be made available 
to Putin’s allied authoritarian leaders in other countries that face popular uprisings. According to 
him, ‘there would not have been this present situation in Ukraine if there in Russia had been 
relevant PMSCs for hire at the time of the crisis for the Yanukovych government. At a time where 
they [the Yanukovych government] could not be certain of the loyalty of their army, they could 
have signed a contract with a Russian PMSC’ (Boiarskii, 2014).  
A fourth motivation for developing Russian PMCs may be to avoid the well-known ‘body 
bag effect’, also a motivating factor in the West. In short, PMSCs could provide Russian authorities 
with a convenient means of utilising military force in operations where the general Russian public 
would be sensitive to casualties. Ever since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), 
there has been considerable scepticism in Russia about risking Russian lives in operations not 
directly connected to the defence of the country. A Levada Centre opinion poll from October 2015 
(the beginning of Russian operations in Syria) suggested that despite more than 50 per cent support 
for the Russian policy towards Syria overall, only 19 per cent were willing to support ‘boots on 
the ground’ (Levada Center, 2015). Private military contractors are often ex-service personnel, but 
tend to garner less support than their public counterparts. One Russian observer suggests sympathy 
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for losses suffered by Wagner personnel is low, largely due to a perception that ‘(...) these people 
are highly paid, and knew what they were getting into’ (Pukhov, 2017).  
The bureaucratic politics of Russian PMSCs 
There have been a number of initiatives in the Duma designed to legalise PMSCs and regulate 
their activities. In 2009, the representative Andrei Lugovoi proposed an amendment to the law 
governing private security companies that would allow them to operate abroad. Similar attempts 
were made in 2012, 2014 and 2018, but none have succeeded so far. 
Some of the domestic resistance to legalising PMSCs is probably ideological and stems 
from concerns regarding the state monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence. An arguably more 
important objection relates to worries regarding who is to control PMSCs. Rival agencies would 
vie for such control because of the potential political clout attached and because of the desire to 
manage any potential future financial resources available to PMSCs. It may be the case that as 
long as the control issue remains undecided, most of the domestic players in Russia prefer the 
current ambiguous existence of these companies to outright legalisation.  
Several Russian sources point to a conflict of interest between the FSB (domestic security 
service) and the GRU (military intelligence) on this issue. The prevalence of competition and 
rivalry between these two agencies is historically well known, and there being a dispute between 
them on the issue of PMSCs does not seem far-fetched, especially not since Wagner in particular 
seems closely aligned to the GRU. One Russian source claims that the GRU ‘has spent 15 years 
on spreading the, in principle false, myth that private military companies play a major role in 
contemporary wars’, and points to what he sees as planted publications on this topic in Russian 
military journals such as Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Foreign Military Review) (Tokarev, 
2017). Other sources maintain that the scepticism towards PMSCs is also strong within the 
military, not only in the FSB, and that both the MOD and the FSB constitute obstacles to the 
adoption of a law on PMSCs (Neelov, 2017). However, even if the GRU may be a driving force 
behind the development of Russian PMSCs, this does not necessarily mean that the institution is 
in favour of legalization. There is every reason to think that the GRU sees the potential benefits of 
the ‘informally allowed to exist’ status. 
That said, it would probably be wrong to suggest, as some have done, that the FSB is 
entirely against the PMSC idea (Tokarev, 2018). If that was the case, PMSCs would most likely 
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not have been able to exist, even in the shadowy way that they do today. The FSB currently enjoys 
enough political pull in the Kremlin to block this phenomenon completely if it so wanted. The 
Russian military observer Arkadii Babchenko is adamant that the FSB is currently in full control 
of the PMSCs (Popkov, 2016). Thus, it seems more likely that the FSB has chosen a strategy of 
allowing the limited development of PMSCs under strict FSB control, rather than trying to block 
such companies from emerging. Control here does not necessarily mean day-to-day monitoring 
and interference. It is more likely that the FSB, and ultimately the Kremlin, have made it clear that 
PMSCs exist at their mercy, will have to do whatever the political leadership tells them and, should 
they fail to comply, can be dissolved almost instantly. This latter point may also help to explain 
the apparent paradox of PMSC existence without legalisation. If they, in the absence of 
legalisation, continue to exist at the FSB’s mercy, they are likely to be easier to oversee and direct.  
It is also likely that there are mixed views on PMSCs within the armed forces. At a conference on 
PMSCs organised by the Academy of the General Staff in March 2016, former Chief of Defence 
General Iurii Baluevskii argued forcefully against legalisation on the grounds that PMSCs have 
the potential to become uncontrollable (Falichev, 2016). Another concern may be that the military 
is not comfortable working alongside presumably less professional and less capable PMSCs, or 
that a PMSC presence in the same theatre would be more of a nuisance than a help to the military 
forces. In addition, the military may also be concerned that PMSCs could consume resources that 
otherwise could have been earmarked for the regular forces. Thus, if PMSCs are allowed to 
continue to exist in Russia, it is, for MOD image purposes, best for the armed forces if they remain 
non-legalised and thus less visible (Polovinko, 2017). 
PMSCs in Russian foreign policy 
Russian PMSCs have existed at least since the mid-2000s, but their role as a tool of foreign policy 
has developed more recently. There is now substantial empirical evidence to suggest that Russia 
over the past five years on several occasions has employed PMSCs in pursuit of national interests 
beyond its borders. Wagner’s participation in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 may have been the 
first major example of this tactic. Since then, their employment by the Kremlin on the rebel side 
in Donbas, and on the side of Assad in Syria, are the most prominent examples. Furthermore, there 
are now firm indications that they have been active in Libya, on the side of President Bashar in 
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Sudan and in support of the government in the Central African Republic, among other places 
(Marten, 2019).  
Two aspects of the Russian use of PMSCs as a tool of foreign policy are particularly 
striking: the diversity of operations in which they have been engaged and the blurring of national 
and private interests in their employment. The full extent of Russian PMSC participation in the 
annexation of Crimea remains unclear. However, Russian sources suggest that at least Wagner 
took part in the preparations for the disputed Crimean referendum on leaving Ukraine (Dergachev 
and Zgirovskaia, 2016). In Donbas, the same company was nicknamed ‘the cleaners’, a name that 
alludes to their role in getting rid of local rebel commanders not to the Kremlin’s liking, and to 
their participation in disciplining anti-Kiev rebel groups that operated too freely. In particular, 
there have been several claims that Wagner was used to discipline the loosely organised Cossack 
groups that fought Ukrainian forces in the Luhansk area (Korotkov, 2015; Guliaiev 2016).  
The above-mentioned examples could arguably be grouped as special operations. 
However, a separatist source also claimed to the online Ukrainian newspaper Strana (The Country) 
that at least Wagner took part in regular high-intensity fighting during the battle of Debaltseve in 
February 2015 (Ivashkina and Skibitskaia, 2016). If that is the case, it is further evidence that 
Russian PMSCs can be used in more conventional military roles. This claim corresponds with how 
Wagner has been utilised in a high-intensity fighting role in Syria. As a former Wagner fighter told 
the Estonian TV channel ETV in July 2017, ‘Wagner is no ordinary private military company. It 
is a miniature army. We had it all, mortars, howitzers, tanks, infantry-fighting vehicles and 
armoured personnel carriers’ (Zakharov, 2017). One commentator describes Wager at the peak of 
activity in Syria as a force consisting of four reconnaissance assault brigades (each made up of 
three companies of up to 100 men), an artillery squadron (three batteries of 100 men each), a tank 
company (twelve tanks), a diversionary-reconnaissance company (150 men), a combat engineering 
company (100 men), a communication company (100 men), and staff and support sub-units 
(Kuczynski, 2018). Whether or not this description is entirely accurate, it seems clear that Wagner 
has capabilities that are a far cry from those of Western PMSCs. That said, it is unlikely that 
Wagner itself owns or controls the weaponry and equipment needed to perform in this way, rather 
it is likely scrambled from the Ministry of Defense. Still, in this case, there was both the permission 
and the ability to mobilize a potent unit of contractors to substitute or support conventional forces.   
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The second striking aspect of the Russian use of PMSCs is how it, as opposed to the use of 
regular military force, potentially blurs national and private interests. In June 2017, the online 
Russian newspaper Fontanka claimed to have seen documents proving that in December 2016 the 
Syrian government and the Russian private company Euro Polis signed a deal in which Euro Polis 
promised to liberate oil and gas fields from Islamic State. In return, Euro Polis was to receive 25 
per cent of the future income from these fields. Euro Polis is owned by the well-known Russian 
businessman and suspected Wagner banker, Yevgenii Prigozhin (Murtazin, 2017; Korotkov 2017), 
and the task of retaking the fields was to be carried out by Wagner. Russian regular forces in Syria 
could not have taken on such a commercial-military contract as this, but a PMSC could. In a 
somewhat similar situation in February 2018 in Deir Ezzor in Syria, an unidentified number of 
Wagner soldiers died in an attempt to force the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces away from 
oil wells they controlled. The 600-strong Wagner force involved in this incident operated in 
support of the Assad-backed militia ‘ISIS Hunters’. However, anonymous Russian military 
sources have characterised the operation as essentially being a local fight over oil resources 
(Solopov, Lusin, Belenkaia, Mishina, Chernenko, & Safronov, 2018). Two Russian commentators 
called this incident the first direct clash between Russian and US forces since the Vietnam War 
(Aptekar and Zhelezneva 2018), while Russian military sources confirmed that this operation was 
initiated without the approval of the Russian command in Syria (Solopov et al., 2018). 
This blurring of national and commercial interests may not be limited only to Syria. The 
above-mentioned separatist source Strana claims that in Donbas, Wagner was ‘integrated into the 
GRU, but also open for private customers on the side’ (Ivashkina and Skibitskaia, 2016). This 
jumbling of interests may not represent a major problem if the national and commercial interests 
coincide, but serious confusion and potential conflict could erupt if they do not. Neither Wagner 
nor any other Russian PMSC would intentionally do something contrary to the will of Putin. 
However, when these companies sometimes are allowed to act according to their own agenda in 
the same theatre of operations, their activities may easily create negative consequences for Russian 
strategic interests. It would be equivalent to having a military unit that over the course of the same 
engagement is sometimes within and sometimes outside the chain of command. 
The Russian PMSC industry is opaque, diverse and somewhat immature, meaning it has 
probably yet to find its shape and role. What that shape and role will be depends on power brokers 
within the security apparatus and in the Kremlin, and the rivalries and power struggles between 
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them. It may also depend on clientelistic dynamics and the balancing of private interests with the 
interests of other elites.  
 
What role for Russian PMSCs in a Russian-Western conflict? 
When Russian PMSCs operate on behalf of the Russian government, they can do so either by 
command or on a contractual basis. The former is possible because the distinction between public 
and private enterprise is more blurred in Russia than in most Western countries. There is little rule 
of law to protect private enterprise from having to carry out the wishes of the political leadership, 
even if they do not want to. Thus, it is easier for the Russian government than for many other 
governments to order private companies to do the government’s bidding. Therefore, whether the 
PMSC in question is a “company” set up to primarily serve the Russian security apparatus and to 
operate in close conjunction with government agencies, such as Wagner, or a registered private 
security firm, such as RSB-Group, might prove unimportant if the state decides that it needs its 
help.  
Despite the fact that Wagner, according to some sources, on occasion fought on the level 
of a battle group in Syria, this seems less likely in the event of a conflict with Western countries, 
and particularly unlikely in a potential conflict with NATO countries. In Syria, Wagner fought the 
relatively lightly armed Islamic State. In a Western context, they would be fighting regular and far 
more heavily armed forces. In such high-intensity scenarios, Russia would probably prefer to use 
its regular forces. Still, one cannot rule out the possibility that PMSCs in some instances would be 
used as force multipliers in situations where Russia found its troops stretched. Nevertheless, we 
argue that PMSCs, in the context of a conflict with one or more Western countries, would be 
valuable to Russia as an instrument that could be used in preparing or shaping the battlefield. In 
fact, there are numerous ways that civilian contractors operating covertly on enemy soil could be 
used to facilitate Russian military operations, to carry out acts of sabotage in order to slow down 
Western military action or limit the options available to mission planners, or simply to paralyse 
civilian societal functions. Importantly, PMSCs could be used covertly to sabotage an enemy 
irrespective of the level of open conflict.  
In many ways, the most obvious potential implication of Russian PMSCs for Western 
security is that Russian authorities could use them in situations where they want a very limited use 
of force for a restricted aim of some kind. One example could be the forced release of a Russian 
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fishing vessel seized by a Western coastguard. In the event that the operation should fail, or if 
some of the Russian operators are arrested, Russia could deny responsibility. It is of course highly 
likely that the government of the other country involved would understand, or at least strongly 
suspect, that the use of force could be attributed to Russian authorities. However, in terms of both 
legal responsibility and the international narrative, there would be a major difference between the 
use of PMSCs and regular forces.  
In a somewhat different scenario, PMSCs could be used to provoke a confrontation with a 
Western country, orchestrating it so that a reaction from the West could be deemed as militarising 
or escalating the situation. Using a maritime example again, Moran Security Group (in contrast 
with most Western maritime PMSCs) has its own small fleet of unmarked vessels that would fit 
such purposes.6 The company also boasts that its core personnel are ex-navy officers. If such a 
ship was used to carry out acts that would warrant a Western country to deploy naval ships or in 
other ways respond using military means, that could very well produce the international crisis 
scenario that the Russian leadership had wanted.   
As the example above illustrates, PMSCs do not necessarily have to use kinetic force in 
order to help Russian authorities achieve foreign policy goals. They could be used, for example, 
to instigate civil unrest, execute cyber-attacks, act as foreign agents or inflict significant economic 
losses. At least one of the Russian PMSCs, ENOT Corp., seems to have run military-type training 
camps for right-wing activists from foreign countries (Goble, 2017). If Russia wanted to put a 
foreign government under pressure, then training right-wing radicals in violent methods before 
sending them back to their home country could be one way of doing that. Meanwhile, RSB-Group 
has established its own dedicated cyber warfare capacity. So far, most cyber operations emanating 
from Russia have been traced back to the FSB or the GRU. In order to avoid direct attribution to 
Russian government agencies in the future, the authorities could start outsourcing more of the 
cyber operations to competent PMSCs.  
The PMSCs could also be useful agents abroad. Personnel associated with the GRU 
allegedly poisoned Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury in 2018; even though Russia 
denied responsibility for the attack, the UK and some of its Western allies claimed GRU agents 
                                                          
6 In fact, a diplomatic issue arouse between Russia and Nigeria after nine crew members of the MV Myre Seadiver, 
one of Moran’s vessels, were arrested on charges of gun-running in 2012. The issue was solved after the Russian 
embassy stepped in and negotiated the crew members’ release from prison. (Marten, 2019). 
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carried it out and responded by expelling Russian diplomats. The risk of such retaliations could be 
lessened by using PMSC personnel without a direct affiliation to any government security agency.  
Additionally, one may also imagine a situation where Russia wanted to harm a Western 
country economically in order to exert pressure on its government or as an act of revenge for 
perceived illegitimate actions against Russia. Here, Russia could, for example, target port 
infrastructure, oil and gas facilities or underwater sea cables. Using PMSCs for such missions 
could create a situation of formal deniability while still sending a clear message to the target 
country. The main takeaway here is that these are just some examples of non-kinetic activities that 
Russian PMSCs could potentially carry out on behalf of the Russian government. In other words, 
PMSCs are an adaptive and flexible tool that could be used in any number of ways and for many 
purposes.  
Within the kinetic spectre, PMSCs could be well suited to ‘preparing’ the target country 
for a possible later arrival of regular Russian forces. The private companies’ activities here could 
include, for example, acts of sabotage, assassination of key personnel, reconnaissance, intelligence 
collection and target identification. PMSCs could hence be very useful in the early stages of a 
conflict or in peacetime by gathering data useful to military operation planning processes. PMSC 
operators (possibly ex-special forces personnel), dressed as civilians would be able to carry out 
reconnaissance work that would provide detailed information on e.g. potential landing sites or 
other local conditions in foreign countries.  
Many of these tasks would normally be the domain of Russian special forces, but the use 
of PMSCs would decrease the potential for attribution. Uncertainty and confusion over attribution 
could slow down the target country’s decision making and complicate appeals for NATO 
guarantees and the invocation of Article 5. Other NATO countries would most likely be hesitant 
to retaliate against Russia and thus risk war if there was a chance that Russia was not to blame for 
the hostile acts. One should note here that Russian military thinking for a long time has entertained 
the idea that there is no longer a clear demarcation between peace and war. The line is blurred, and 
efforts to achieve strategic aims may move back and forth between states of civilian and military 
aggression.  
Additionally, PMSCs could be employed as smokescreens for regular Russian soldiers or 
special forces personnel in locations or contexts where deploying Russian soldiers would not sit 
well nationally or internationally. Simply put, regular Russian troops could be disguised as 
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PMSCs. Russian-speaking personnel could thus be carrying out activities in locations under the 
cover of commercial agencies. This type of cover-up would be plausible in cases where Russia 
was providing unofficial state support for a regime or a militia, or where it for other reasons wanted 
to maintain a low profile or a light footprint. For example, given the close relationship between 
the GRU and Wagner, it is not unthinkable that the same personnel may operate for both 
organisations in some cases; one should not rule out shoulder patches being swopped according to 
assignment or convenience. Such an approach may not be very farfetched; after all, a similar mode 
of operation designed to offer military assistance covertly was used in several countries during the 
cold war when Soviet soldiers and military instructors were sent to the Middle East as ‘tourists’ 
(Sukhankin, 2018). Most PMSCs boasts their senior leadership hailing from various special forces 
units, the FSB or GRU, and that they employ former service personnel from the ranks of GRU and 
FSB. Many likely also remain in the reserves for such units (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2018). 
This confirms that the ties between some of the Russian PMSCs and divisions of the state security 
apparatus are close, but it also suggests that the dividing lines between them at times may be 
porous. The PMSC Shchit for example, seems largely to be a commercial outcrop of the 45th 
special forces regiment of the Airborne Forces (Korotkov, 2019). 
Finally, PMSC activities in working against a foreign state may in principle also be initiated 
by the PMSC itself or by its owners or sponsors. There is reason to believe that not all hostile 
activity in support of Russian political goals, for example in cyber space, is directly ordered by 
Russian authorities. Some of it may be initiated bottom-up, and could be motivated by idealistic 
patriotism designed to earn goodwill from decision makers. One cannot rule out Russian PMSCs 
doing something similar, especially the more ideologically motivated among them. On the other 
hand, companies that strive for a position among international PMSCs are probably less likely to 
engage in such activities. Furthermore, any actor contemplating taking action on behalf of Russia 
without the explicit consent of Russian authorities would probably be relatively careful when 
deciding on the activities in which they should engage. They would know that they could easily 
end up putting the Russian government in an awkward position, and that this could backfire and 
leave them facing extremely negative consequences at home.  
 
Russian PMSCs in conflicts in developing countries  
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As already described, Russian PMSCs have started to have a presence in several conflict-ridden 
countries in the developing world, including South Sudan, Libya and the Central African Republic. 
In these war-torn countries, PMSC personnel have been reported to provide military training, but 
also to in more direct ways, meddle in internal power struggles. In Libya, there are reports that 
Wagner has been an active supporter of warlord Kahlifa Haftar, the self-declared field marshal of 
the ‘Libyan National Army’ who aspires to overthrow the UN backed government in Tripoli. 
While the exact role of Wagner is not entirely clear, it seems to include military training, political 
‘counselling’ and information campaigns (see e.g. Weiss and Vaux 2019). In some cases, Russian 
PMSCs thus have a proxy role in weak states, which in fact may affect who holds power in such 
states.  
The presence and participation of Russian PMSC in violent conflicts may also have direct 
consequences for civilians in those conflicts, as well as for Western forces in the same theatre. In 
the wake of the PMSC boom during the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, several instances 
of PMSC misbehaviour were reported in the Western media. This triggered debates in both 
political and academic circles regarding what PMSC proliferation meant for the security of 
civilians in war zones. Such worries are also warranted in the case of Russian PMSCs; in fact, 
Russian PMSCs may pose an even greater risk to civilians in conflict zones than Western PMSCs 
do. This hypothesis rests on two assumptions. First, Russian military culture is relatively more 
tolerant of collateral damage in terms of civilian life than the cultures prevalent in many other 
countries. Observers will point here to the two Chechen wars, and the bombings of Grozny in 
particular, as evidence of a military culture less concerned with collateral damage. Similar 
evidence of limited sensitivity to collateral damage can be observed in the Russian war effort in 
Syria since 2015, as illustrated by the aerial bombardment of population centres and the use of 
cluster munitions (Bostad, 2018). The second assumption is that Russian PMSCs may be less 
constrained by the risk of reputational damage than their Western counterparts. For example, 
Russian PMSCs have not experienced the same level of criticism related to violent conduct as the 
Western PMSCs did when they worked in Iraq. This means that not only are Russian PMSCs’ 
personnel likely to be drawn from a military culture that has a comparatively higher acceptance of 
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loss of civilian life, they are probably also less likely than PMSCs from other countries to face 
sanctions from their own government for causing such losses.7 
Russian PMSCs may also cause harm due to their propensity to work for regimes that care 
little about human rights. They cater for many of the same clients as Western PMSCs do, in 
particular oil and gas companies operating in conflict zones and shipping companies hiring guards 
to protect against piracy, but after Donbas and Syria there might be an increasing tendency for 
Russian PMSCs to sign contracts with regimes in developing countries that have questionable 
human rights records. For example, the fact that Russian PMSCs are working for the governments 
of Sudan and the Central African Republic point in such a direction (Iakoreva, 2018). Both these 
countries were, according to Freedom House, among the 11 worst in the world in terms of political 
rights and civil liberties in 2018. As argued earlier in this article, the provision of violent force for 
the suppression of domestic rebellion in other countries has even been presented as a motive for 
the legalisation of PMSCs by some Russian lawmakers. Thus, there is a danger that Russian 
PMSCs may become an additional source of repressive capacity for some of the world’s most 
oppressive regimes.  
Violent conflicts in developing countries may also lead Russian and Western PMSCs to be 
pitched against each other causing friction between Russia and the Western state home to the 
Western PMSC. Worse still, Western military forces could find themselves fighting Russian 
PMSCs acting as proxies for state or non-state adversaries of the West. This has already happened, 
in February 2018, when US warplanes bombed forces on the ground in Syria that included Russian 
Wagner fighters. The number of Wagner fighters killed remains a matter of controversy, but the 
episode created international headlines and provoked the fear that Russia would see this as an act 
of violence against the Russian state. Fortunately, that did not happen. According to former US 
Defence Secretary Jim Mattis, the Russian forces in Syria used the established deconfliction line 
to convey to US commanders that Wagner in this case was acting outside of their control (Pawlyk, 
2018). That, however, may not always be the case in the future. Thus, the danger is both that 
Western countries’ adversaries in such conflicts may be militarily augmented by Russian PMSCs, 
and that the Russian authorities may come to see attacks on their PMSCs as more problematic than 
                                                          
7 Importantly, Western PMSCs have also rarely been held to account for misbehaviour in theatres. The case of four 
Blackwater operators in 2010 was the first widely publicised trial where PMSC personnel were convicted of 
murders committed in Iraq.  
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they did in the February 2018 example in Syria. Russian reaction to similar incidents in the future 
will probably depend on the ties that the PMSC in question has to Russian authorities in general, 
and in the theatre in question in particular.  
Russian PMSCs might also be engaged to fight directly on behalf of the Kremlin in 
international conflicts. While that did not seem to be the case in the Wagner episode in February 
2018, it was most probably true in the two fights for Palmyra in March 2016 and March 2017. 
Since these were both battles against Islamic State, US or other Western forces had no reason to 
attempt to prevent the Syrian and Russian offensives. However, it is not difficult to imagine a 
future situation where a Kremlin-backed Russian PMSC fights a local ally of Western forces. In 
such situations, Western countries would have to take into account that supporting its ally might 
result in an escalation into a conflict with Russia. Worst case, the antagonist of the Western ally 
may invite Russian PMSCs specifically for this purpose, and the expectation that the Kremlin will 
see attacks on Russian PMSCs as an affront to itself may embolden the antagonist to be more 
offensive than it otherwise would have been. Thus, the extent to which Russian PMSCs will act 
on behalf of the Russian government in future international conflicts is likely to be crucial in terms 
of the effect their development has on Western security. 
Finally, we cannot disregard the possibility that an actor allied to a Western country will 
hire Russian PMSCs to boost its military capacity beyond what the Western partner can offer. For 
instance, Nigeria hired STTEP International to help combat Boko Haram in 2015; STTEP is a 
PMSC with links to the defunct Executive Outcomes, and it allegedly does not shy away from 
engaging in combat. Nigeria at the same time has recurrently received various forms of military 
training from Western countries, also with the aim of helping its forces confront Boko Haram (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2018). Thus, there is at least a theoretical possibility that Western forces 
at some point in the future may find themselves fighting alongside Russian PMSCs. This would 
probably not create many problems with regard to relations with the Kremlin, but if the Russian 
PMSCs were to show a disregard for human rights or civilian casualties, such fighting may become 
a dilemma and a significant source of embarrassment for the Western countries engaged in that 
particular conflict.  
Some of the possible consequences for international security pointed out in this article may 
seem somewhat startling. After all, the Russian PMSC industry is still relatively limited, and 
Russia as an international actor is not militarily engaged in many countries around the world. 
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Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the nervousness created by the US bombing of Wagner in Syria 
in February 2018, things may change quickly. Six years after the little green men invaded Crimea, 
Western strategic thinking still does not seem to reflect the wide range of possibilities available to 
powers that tend not to worry much about international humanitarian law.  
 
Conclusions 
Despite Russian rhetoric on the need for a state monopoly on the use of force, and despite 
resistance in Russia to the legalisation of PMSCs, the country already has a record of outsourcing 
violence to private entrepreneurs (Østensen and Bukkvoll, 2018). The Russian PMSC industry is 
not an entirely new manifestation of this inclination, rather it dates back to the 1990s. The Russian 
PMSC industry is still relatively small and heterogeneous in terms of professionalism and the 
services on offer. Compared to most Western PMSCs, Russian companies appear more rugged and 
more likely to take part in direct combat. 
The still-lacking Russian legalisation of PMSCs is somewhat puzzling given that as far 
back as 2012, President Putin spoke positively about the development of such companies. We find 
the answers to this puzzle in the strong ideological resentment towards PMSCs in some quarters 
of the Russian elite, and even more in state agency infighting over who will control PMSCs. 
Nevertheless, despite the absence of formal legality, Russian PMSCs are a reality, and there are 
few indications that they will disappear. If anything, they have lately become more active and more 
important, especially due to their role in the Donbas and Syrian wars and their increasing 
engagement in several African countries. Western countries should anticipate that Russian PMSCs 
may well continue to be a feature in violent conflicts where Russia is a party. However, Western 
countries should also anticipate PMSCs being used to carry out a wide array of actions within the 
hostile spectrum, in war and in peace, and in the grey zones between war and peace.  
The modern use of commercial military and security companies in war zones can still be 
seen as a particularly Western, or even a US, phenomenon. Nonetheless, as with most other 
military innovations, it has come to be emulated in other regions of the world. It will, however, 
almost never be the case that military innovations are simply copied. When entering new political, 
economic and cultural realities, these groups will inevitably take local forms, and while the exact 
shape and role of the Russian PMSC industry is not yet carved out fully, Russia is now home to a 
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small, but potent, PMSC industry that can be mobilised to inflict harm on Russia’s enemies if 
called upon. Understanding the Russian conception of this ‘tool’, and understanding what 
advantages these companies might offer in complementing any Russian use of force, is therefore 
an important part of understanding Russian strategic thinking.  
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